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Abstract 
Inspired by game theory representations, Bayesian networks, influence diagrams, structured 
Markov decision process models, logic programming, and work in dynamical systems, the inde- 
pendent choice logic (ICL) is a semantic framework that allows for independent choices (made 
by various agents, including nature) and a logic program that gives the consequence of choices. 
This representation can be used as a specification for agents that act in a world, make observa- 
tions of that world and have memory, as well as a modelling tool for dynamic environments with 
uncertainty The rules specify the consequences of an action, what can be sensed and the utility of 
outcomes. This paper presents a possible-worlds emantics for ICL, and shows how to embed in- 
fluence diagrams, structured Markov decision processes, and both the strategic (normal) form and 
extensive (game-tree) form of games within the ICL. It is argued that the ICL provides a natural 
and concise representation for multi-agent decision-making under uncertainty that allows for the 
representation of structured probability tables, the dynamic construction of networks (through the 
use of logical variables) and a way to handle uncertainty and decisions in a logical representation, 
@ 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. 
1. Introduction 
This paper presents the Independent Choice Logic (ICL), a logic for modelling 
multiple agents under uncertainty. It is inspired by game theory [ 17,32,53], Bayesian 
networks [ 7,351, influence diagrams [ 22,231, probabilistic Horn abduction [ 361, struc- 
tured representations of Bayesian networks and Markov decision processes [ 5,7,8], 
agent ma,delling and dynamical systems [ 29,48,5 1,571 and logical modelling of action 
and change [ 27,45,50]. 
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First we motivate ICL from a number of different perspectives, then show how 
it fits within the paradigms of knowledge representation (Section 1.1). In separate 
subsections we present the foundations of ICL based on agents (Section 1.2), game 
theory (Section 1.3), influence diagrams (Section 1.4) and logic (Section 1.5). We 
then build the formal definition of the representation in Section 2. The majority of 
this paper presents examples of the use of the logic, including showing how influence 
diagrams, Markov decision processes, and the strategic and extensive forms of games 
can be represented. 
Bayesian or belief networks [ 351 provide a useful representation for reasoning under 
uncertainty. Bayesian networks are a representation of independence amongst random 
variables. The Bayesian network model does not constrain how a variable depends on its 
parents, nor does it specify a representation for the conditional probability of a variable 
given its parents in the network. The conditional probabilities of variables given their 
parents are typically represented as tables, but can often be specified more compactly in 
terms of trees [ 71 or rules [ 361. Rules are more compact than trees (unless the trees can 
have shared structure and redundant tests), in the sense that there are some functions 
where the tree representation is exponentially larger than the rule representation, but 
the converse does not hold.’ Rules have the added advantage that there is a natural 
extension to the first-order case [ 361. This paper builds on probabilistic Horn abduction 
[ 361, a first-order rule-based representation for Bayesian networks, allowing negation 
as failure and fewer restriction on the rules than in probabilistic Horn abduction. This 
paper extends the probabilistic framework to include utilities and decisions made by 
multiple agents, so that not only can the knowledge base be expressed compactly by 
rules, but agents’ policies can also be expressed by rules. 
Logic has become the primary focus of knowledge representation in AI. This is 
because it provides a way to give meaning to symbols and a way to specify what 
you want to compute independently of how it is computed [42]. It has often been 
argued (e.g., [33] ) that any general representation scheme must be at least as rich 
as the first-order predicate calculus. One of the problems with the first order predicate 
calculus is the way it handles uncertainty; all it has available is disjunction. This is 
a rather blunt instrument and does not do justice to all of the subtleties involved in 
reasoning under uncertainty. Rather than adding uncertainty to the first-order predicate 
calculus [ 3,19,20,24], which would entail having both disjunctive and probabilistic 
uncertainty, this paper proposes that we should use probability and decision theory, 
instead of disjunction, to handle uncertainty. In the ICL, we start with a logic does 
not include any uncertainty and is definitive on all propositions (every theory entails 
exactly one of p or up for all propositions p). Agents own alternatives, which are sets 
of propositions. An agent gets to choose one value from each alternative that it owns. 
Nature is a special agent; the alternatives owned by nature have a probability distribution 
over them. The logic gives the consequences of the choices made by nature and the 
’ As we allow negation as failure in the roles, the rules can be seen as a DNF definition of a concept (using 
Clark’s completion [ 111). It is known that DNF formulae sometimes entail an exponential blow up in size 
when converted to decision trees [ 461. Decision trees can be converted simply to mles, with a role for each 
leaf in the decision tree whose body corresponds to the path to the leaf. 
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agents. This allows us to have the advantages of logic, with symbols that can be given 
denotations, specifications of valid consequences and first-order representations, but also 
lets us use the normative tools of decision/game theory notions to determine what an 
agent should do. 
Models, of dynamical systems (see e.g., [ 29,441) have traditionally been described 
in terms of state spaces, for example treating state spaces in terms of vectors of states 
and state transition functions in terms of matrices. It is often much more convenient 
to describe a state space in terms of propositions, and describe the state transition 
function in terms of these propositions. The state transition function can be stated con- 
cisely in terms of Bayesian networks [ 121 or even more concisely by trees [ $81 
or rules 11401, never referring to the explicit state. The number of variables is loga- 
rithmic in the size of the state space. The effects of actions are typically local, the 
value of a variable depending only on a few other variables. This provides the poten- 
tial to take advantage of the compactness of the propositional representation. In the 
ICL we specify state transition functions in terms of rules. One advantage of rules 
is that they are closer to the traditional AI representations such as the situation cal- 
culus [ 3 1 ] (see [ 401) . The first-order nature of the rules, with explicit reference to 
the stage or situation make the rules perspicuous. The rule based representation also 
helps clarify the close relationship between regression planning and dynamic program- 
ming. 
1.1. Knowledge representation 
There axe two different views of what a knowledge representation should be. 
l The first is that a knowledge representation should let users state whatever knowl- 
edge they have in a reasonably natural way. Under this view it is not appropriate 
for the designer of a knowledge representation to specify how a piece of knowl- 
edge should be encoded. Reasoning can conclude what logically follows from the 
stated facts or can fill in missing facts in a common sense manner. An example of 
this view is in the use of the first-order predicate calculus for knowledge represen- 
tation. It is a rich enough language to let us state many facts about the world, but 
with primitive means to handle uncertainty. Within this tradition, logics have been 
deve:loped to handle uncertainty and multiple agents making decisions [3,15,19- 
21, ;!4]. Missing facts can be inferred using default reasoning [ 301, or by making 
maximum entropy or random worlds assumptions [ 41. What is important is that 
the user can add whatever they like to the knowledge base, and the representation 
should be able to make appropriate inferences. 
l The second view is that a knowledge representation should provide a high-level 
symlbolic modelling language that makes some things easier to state. Under this 
view a knowledge representation should specify how to model a domain. It should 
guide users as to how they should think about the domain, what they should say; 
and once some choices have been made, it prescribes what information needs to 
be specified. An example is Bayesian networks [ 351, which provide a modelling 
tool for representing independence amongst random variables. The user needs to 
specify the random variables of interest, the values these variables can take, and 
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the dependency amongst hese variables. Once these are specified the Bayesian 
network model prescribes what probabilities need to be specified. 
It is important not to confuse these, as judging a knowledge representation by the 
inappropriate criteria will lead to an unfair judgment. The knowledge representation i
this paper should be seen as an instance of the second. We do not expect hat people will 
be able to just throw any knowledge in. For example, missing rules have a particular 
meaning; if you want to assert ignorance there are specific ways to do it. 
1.2. Agents 
An agent is something that acts in the world. An agent can, for example, be a person, 
a robot, a worm, the wind, gravity, a lamp, or anything else. Purposive agents have 
preferences-they prefer some states of the world to other states-and act in order to 
(try to) achieve worlds they prefer. The non-purposive agents are grouped together 
and called “nature”. Whether an agent is purposive or not is a modelling assumption 
that may or may not be appropriate. For example, for some applications it may be 
appropriate to model a dog as purposive, and for others it may suffice to model a dog 
as non-purposive. 
Agents can have sensors, (possibly limited) memory, computational capabilities and 
effecters. Agents reason and act in time. 
An agent should react to the world; it has to condition its actions on what is received 
by its sensors. These sensors may or may not reflect what is true in the world;2 sensors 
can be noisy, unreliable or broken; and even when sensors are reliable there is still 
ambiguity about the world from sensors’ readings. An agent can only condition its 
actions on what it knows, even if it is very weak such as “sensor a appears to be 
outputting value u”. Similarly actuators may be noisy, unreliable, slow or broken. What 
an agent can control is what message (command) it sends to its actuators. 
An agent can be seen as an implementation of a transduction [39,47,48,57], a 
function from input (sensor readings) history into outputs (action attempts or actuator 
settings) at each time point. These are causal in the sense that the output can only 
depend on current inputs and previous inputs and outputs; they cannot be conditional 
on future inputs or outputs. 
A policy or strategy is a specification of what an agent will do under various contin- 
gencies. That is, it is a representation f a transduction. A plan is a policy that includes 
either time or the stage as part of the contingencies conditioned on. 
Our aim is to provide a representation i which we can define perception, actions 
and preferences for agents. This can be used to define a policy, the notion of when 
one policy is better than another (according to that agent’s preferences), and so an 
appropriate notion of an optimal policy for an agent. Once we have defined what an 
optimal policy is, we can use exact and approximation algorithms to build policies for 
agents. 
* Of course if there is no correlation between what a sensor eading tells us and what is true in the world, 
and the preferences of the agent depend on what is true in the world (as they usually do), it may as well 
ignore the sensor. 
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We want to model agents and their environments with the same language. The lan- 
guage should provide a decision theoretic, or game theoretic (for more than one agent) 
framework that can be used to build agents that can be shown to be optimal (as in [ 481) 
or at least to have a specification of the expected utility of an agent. A planner in this 
framework is a program that generates a (possibly stochastic) transduction for an agent 
to execute. The output of the planner should be suitable for actually controlling an agent. 
It has to be more than a sequence of steps that is the output of traditional planners. Here 
we consider reactive agents that have internal state. This paper does not consider the 
problem of building a planner. Even for the single-agent propositional case, the problem 
of finding an optimal policy is computationally prohibitive [25], but this is more a 
property of the problem than of the representation. By having a rich representation we 
can discuss the complexity of various restrictions and build approximation algorithms. 
Under this view, beliefs, desires, intentions, and commitments [51] are not essential 
to agenthood. It may, however, be the case that agents with beliefs, desires, intentions, 
and commitments hat, for example, communicate by way of speech acts [ 5 11, perform 
better by some measure than those that do not. We do not want to define agenthood to 
exclude the possibility of formulating and testing this empirical claim. 
In this paper we provide a representation that can be used to model the world, agents 
(including available sensors and actuators) and goals (in terms of the agents utilities 
in different situations) that will allow us to design optimal (or approximately optimal) 
agents. 
1.3. Game theory 
Game theory [ 17,32,53] is a theory of multi-agent reasoning under uncertainty. The 
general idea is that there is a set of players (agents) who make moves (take actions) 
based on what they observe. The agents each try to do as well as they can (maximize 
their utility). 
Game theory is designed to be a general theory of economic behaviour [53] that is 
a generalization of decision theory. The use of the term “game” here is much richer 
than typically studied in AI text books for parlour games uch as chess. These could be 
described as deterministic (there are no chance moves by nature), perfect information 
(each plalyer knows the previous moves of the other players), zero-sum (one player can 
only win by making the other player lose), two-person games. Each of these assumptions 
can be lifted [ 531. 
A game is a sequence of moves taken sequentially or concurrently by a finite set of 
agents. Nature is usually treated as a special agent. There are two main (essentially 
equivalent in power [ 171) representations of games, namely the extensive form and the 
normalized [531 (or strategic [17,321) form of a game. 
The extensive form of a game is specified in terms of a tree; each node belongs to 
an agent, and the arcs from a node correspond to all of the possible moves (actions) 
of that agent. A branch from the root to a leaf corresponds to a possible play of the 
game. Information availability is represented in terms of information sets which are sets 
of nodes that an agent cannot distinguish. The aim is for each agent o choose a move 
at each of the information sets. 





(0.9,O.l) (0. I, 0.9) 
(0.2,0.8) (0.9,O.l) 
Fig. 1. Expected pay-off matrix for the game of Example 1. Payoff (~1, ~2) indicates that the kicker has an 
expected payoff of UI (where a goal is worth one, and a block is worth zero for the kicker) and that the 
goalie has an expected payoff of u2 (where a goal is worth zero, and a block is worth one for the goalie). 
In the strategic form of a game each player adopts a strategy, where a strategy is “a 
plan . . .which specifies what choices [an agent] will make in every possible situation” 
[53, p. 791. This is represented as a function from information available to the agent’s 
move. 
The initial framework developed here should be seen as a representation based on the 
normalized form of a game, with a possible world corresponding to a complete play 
of a game. In the ICL we add a logic program to give the consequences of the play. 
This allows us to use a logical representation for the world and for agents. Section 5.5 
presents a representation that is closer to the extensive form of a game. 
Where there are agents with competing interests, the best strategy is often a random- 
ized strategy. In these cases the agent decides to randomly choose actions based on 
some probability distribution. 
Example 1. Consider a problem in designing soccer playing robots. In particular we 
want to consider the problem of a penalty kick. Penalty kicks are used to decide a 
winner in some soccer games that are tied at the end of regulation time. In a penalty 
kick, there are two agents: a kicker who is trying to score a goal, and a goalie who 
is trying to prevent the goal. The goalie must commit to either jumping left or right 
before they know whether the kicker will kick right or left (of course, neither want to 
let the other know which direction they will go). Suppose for this example, that if the 
goalie jumps (to its) left and the kicker kicks (to its) left, there is a 90% chance of a 
goal. Similarly if they both go (to their own) right, there is a 90% chance of a goal. If 
the kicker kicks left and the goalie jumps right there is a 10% chance of a goal. If the 
kicker kicks right and the goalie jumps left, there is a 20% chance of a goal (this could 
happen if the goalie is right handed). See Fig. 1 for a payoff matrix for this example. 
The goalie should not reason that “I am better when I jump right so I should jump 
right”. For then the kicker (realizing this) will always kick right. The goalie could then 
think that “as the kicker will kick right I should jump left”. In which case the kicker 
should kick left. This is a never ending regress. Such problems have been well studied 
in game theory [ 531. It turns out that the best strategy for the goalie is to randomize 
its choice. Similarly the best strategy for the kicker is to randomize its choice. In this 
example it is best for the kicker to kick right with probability 8/15, and best for the 
goalie to jump right with probability 7/15 in the sense that if either deviate from this 
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randomized strategy, the other can exploit the deviation to have a higher chance of either 
scoring a goal or stopping a goal (see Example 22 for a derivation of these numbers). 
1.4. Injutrnce diagrams 
Influence diagrams 1231 (see the papers in [ 341) are a graphical representation of
decision problems that extend Bayesian networks to include decision nodes and value 
nodes. Infuence diagrams provide a perspicuous representation for decision problems 
making explicit the probabilistic dependencies and the information available when a 
decision is made (see e.g., [22]) 
The propositional version of the logic presented here can be seen as a representation 
for influence diagrams (see Section 3.1), where we can use rules to specify conditional 
probabilities [361, rules to specify utility and the policies of agents are specified as logic 
programs that imply what an agent will do based on its observations. The ICL allows 
specification of the influence diagram in a logic that lets us axiomatise the dynamics of 
the world, derive implicit information from explicit knowledge, and has a formal and 
natural semantics. 
The independent choice logic (ICL) preserves the repr~entation~ clarity of influence 
diagrams and extends them in four ways: 
The first advance is for representation f structured probability tables. The use of 
rules, allows for the compact representation of probability tables (similar to the 
use of decision trees for specifying probability and utility tables [5,52]). For 
example, although some variable d may depend on variables a, b and c, it may 
only depend on b when a has one value and on c when a has another value. 
This asymmetric dependency can be easily expressed in rules, forming a much 
more compact representation than the traditional tables. The rule structure can 
be exploited for efficiency [ 5,38,41]. The same rule-based representation can be 
used to express the policies. 
The use of logical variables allows for a form of first-order influence diagrams. 
These form a method for the dynamic construction of influence diagrams [9,361. 
The use of the rule base means we do not have to specify in one step how a variable 
depends on its parents; we can use arbitrary computation. For example, we can 
axiomatise the dynamics of a domain and use the ~iomatisation to specify how 
the position at one time depends on the position at a previous time in a compact 
way. This features will be exploited for many of the examples. 
The ICL can also handle multiple agents making decisions, permitting a form 
of multiple-agent influence diagrams. We are thus importing the representational 
advantages of influence diagrams into game-theory representations. 
Note that extending the representation to logical variables and multiple agents increases 
the worst case computational complexity of deriving optimal plans;3 this is because 
the problems that can be represented are more complex. It is not a problem with the 
representation per se. 
3 The use of variables makes it undecidable, but even without variables, multi-agent reasoning isexponentially 
harder than modelling a singte no-forgetting agent 1251. 
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1.5. Logic 
Our aim is to define a logic where all uncertainty is resolved by decision/game 
theory rather than using disjunction to encode uncertainty. We start with a logic that 
has no uncertainty; it is definitive on the value of every proposition. We then show 
how uncertainty can be modelled as alternatives that are chosen by agents or have a 
probability distribution over them. The logic tells us the consequences of the choices. 
We are treating logic as the modelling language of the world. Rather than having 
logic at the meta-level describing an object level in another language such as GOLOG 
[ 281 or constraint nets [ 561, we are using the logic to represent the object level. There 
is no other representation apart from the logic. We use the logic to axiomatise the causal 
structure of the world and the causal structure of agents (all of which are defined in 
terms of propositions). 4 
Rather than using disjunction to handle uncertainty, as in the predicate calculus, 
we want to use probability and decision theory to handle the uncertainty. There are 
normative arguments as to why we should use probability and utilities for reasoning 
under uncertainty [ 491. The aim here is to get as much as we can from logic, but using 
decision or game theory to handle all of the uncertainty. 
Starting a logic without uncertainty potentially lets us sidestep many traditional prob- 
lems, or at least adopt simple solutions. For example, it seems as though the frame 
problem in the situation calculus [ 311 is solved for the case with complete knowledge 
and deterministic actions [ 27,45,50] ; when there is incomplete knowledge and nonde- 
terministic actions, there are still many problems to be resolved (see e.g., [6] ). This 
paper takes quite a different view to other proposals, where we resolve nondeterminism 
and uncertainty by considering “who gets to resolve the uncertainty”. We consider all 
actions as deterministic but with hidden variables, and have probabilities over these 
variables or have them chosen by different agents. This become a very powerful and 
arguably natural way to model non-deterministic action (see Section 5.4 and [ 401) . 
2. Independent choice logic 
In this section we formalize the independent choice logic. We first give a general 
abstract definition of how an independent choice logic can be constructed from a base 
logic. In order to make the paper and examples more concrete we adopt acyclic logic 
programs under the stable model semantics as the base logic. 
An independent choice logic (ICL) is a logic built with a specific semantic construc- 
tion. We assume that we are given a base logic that conforms to some restrictions. The 
construction below specifies how to build possible worlds. Possible worlds are built by 
choosing propositions from sets of independent choice alternatives. The base logic is 
used to determine truth in the possible worlds. 
4 All of the logical statements in this paper arc at the object level (i.e., are about the domain being axiomatised 
rather than being axioms about the formalism). This was done in order to reduce confusion: we do not need 
two different languages and the problems of quoting one language. All of the me&level statements here are 
given in English or normal mathematical notation. 
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The base logic is defined on two languages, the language CF of facts, and the language 
,LQ of qtreries, and a consequence relation k between elements of &Z and elements of 
CQ. That is, k is a relation on LF x LQ. It is usually written in infix notation. We 
assume that languages 13~ and LQ are logical languages which share the same atomic 
formulae. After the definition of the semantic construction we discuss what properties 
we want of CF and LQ. 
Definition 2. A base logic is a triple (LF, k, CQ) such that LF and LQ are languages 
and b is a consequence relation. 
Definition 3. An independent choice logic theory on base (LF, b, CQ) is a pair (C, F), 
where 
l C, called the choice space, is a set of sets of ground atomic formulae from language 
LF, such that if x1 E C, x2 E C and x1 # x2 then x1 n x2 = {}. An element of 
C is called an alternative. An element of an alternative is called an atomic choice. 
l 3, called the facts or the rule base, is a set of formulae in logic CF. 
The base logic is often omitted when it can be understood from context. 
The semantics of an ICL is defined in terms of possible worlds. There is a possible 
world for each selection of one element from each alternative. The atoms which follow 
using the consequence relation from these atoms together with 3 are true in this possible 
world. 
Definition 4. Given independent choice logic theory (C, F), a selector function is a 
mapping r : C -+ IJ C such that r(x) E x for all x E C. The range of selector function 
7, written R(r) is the set {r(x) 1 x E C}. The range of a selector function will be 
called a total choice. 
The basic semantic construction we want for the ICL is that each selector function 
corresponds to one possible world, where every element of the range of the selector 
function :IS true. The facts 3 specify what else is true in the possible world. 
First we define restrictions on the base logic to ensure that the semantic construction 
gives a well defined semantics: 
Definition 5. Base logic (LF, k, CQ) and ICL theory (C, F) are dejkitive if for every 
selector function 7, 
l if -la is the negation of a in language CQ 5 then for each ground atom a of CQ, 
either FUR(T) k a or FUR( 7) b -a, and it is not the case that FUR(r) b a 
and 3 U R(T) f- TZ, and 
l if o is an atomic choice then 3 U R(T) j- (Y if and only if cr E R(r). 
5 If LQ does not contain a negation then the property we need is that the set of atomic formulae that follow 
(using /-) from .FUR( T) completely determines the other formulae that follow from FUR(T). This means, 
for example that if F U ‘R(T) b a V b then FUR(T) /-- n or F U R(T) b b. 
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Definition 6. Suppose we are given definitive base logic (&, k, ,Co) and ICL theory 
(C, 3). For each selector function r there is a possible world w,. If f is a formula in 
language ,Co, and w, is a possible world, we write w, k(c,3) f, read “f is true in world 
w, based on (C,.F)“, iff F U R(r) b f. When understood from context, the (C, J=‘) is 
omitted as a subscript of k. 
The fact that every proposition is either true or false in a possible world follows from 
the definitiveness of the base logic. 
Note that, for each alternative x E C and for each world w7, there is exactly one 
element of x that is true in w,. In particular, w, b r(x), and w, # LY for all a E 
x - {r(x)}. 
2.1. The languages LF and LQ 
Languages LF and LQ are logical languages which share the same propositions. The 
reason they are different is that we want to impose restrictions on each so that they are 
appropriate for their task. 
For the rest of this paper we assume that LQ is the propositional logic with atoms 
(propositions) corresponding to the set of ground atoms of CF. In this paper we will 
ignore issues relating to variables in LQ. We will allow arbitrary logical connectives 
(e.g., conjunction, disjunction, negation, etc.) in LQ. 
If we want to use the independent choice framework we have to choose a logic 
(language LF plus consequence relation k) that has the property that it gives us a 
unique model for each total choice. This means two things: 
l Each selection of an element from each alternative is consistent. This means that 
the logic cannot allow a selection of choices from some alternatives to impose 
any restrictions on choices from other alternatives. This, for example, disallows 
the logic from being the arbitrary predicate calculus or even Horn clauses with 
integrity constraints [ 271. 
l Each total choice cannot be extended into more than one possible world. This 
excludes us from having explicit disjunctions in our logic.6 It also means, for 
example, that we cannot have logic programs under the stable model seman- 
tics which may have none or more than one stable model.7 We are also ex- 
cluding three valued models of logic programs (e.g., [43] ) from consideration 
(whether extending our semantics in this way is useful or not is an open ques- 
tion) . 
6 Disjunction can be seen as a form of uncertainty. In some sense what we are pursuing here is that idea 
that all uncertainty can be relegated to the choice space, leaving the logic to give the consequences of the 
choices. This should be contrasted with other approaches (e.g., [ 31) that allow both sorts of uncertainty. We 
end up with a much simpler language, but handle uncertainty by considering different agents getting to choose 
alternatives. Whether this is a good (both computationally and ergonomically) idea is an empirical question 
currently under study. 
’ The program a + lb, b + ya has two stable models, one with a true and one with b true. The program 
(1 - -a has no stable models. 
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2.2. Acyclic logic programs 
In order to use an ICL we must commit to a base logic. In this paper, we consider 
the language 13~ to consist of logic programs with a unique stable model [ 181, and the 
consequence relation to be truth in the stable model [ 181. That is, logic program P t- q 
if q is true in the unique stable model of P. One way to ensure there is a unique stable 
model is to restrict the programs to be acyclic [2]. 
In this section we give the language and the semantics of acyclic logic programs. The 
language follows Prolog’s conventions. 
Definition 7. A variable is an alphanumeric string (possibly including “_“) starting 
with an upper case letter. 
A constant or a function symbol or a predicate symbol is an alphanumeric string not 
starting with an uppercase letter. 
A term is either a variable, a constant, or has the form f( tl, . . . , t,,) where f is a 
function symbol and tl , . . . , t,,, are terms. 
An atom is either a predicate symbol, or has the form p( tl , . . . , t,,,) where p is a 
predicate symbol and tl, . . . , tm are terms. 
A literal is either an atom or has the form lcr where a is an atom. 
A body is either a literal or a conjunction of bodies (the conjunction of PI and & is 
written as: PI A &). 
A cZause is either an atom or has the form (Y + p where LY is an atom (called the 
head of the clause) and p is a body. The latter form is called a rule. 
A program is a set of clauses. 
A groltnd term, atom or clause is one that does not contain any variables. A ground 
instance of a clause c is a clause obtained by uniformly replacing ground terms for the 
variables in c. 
Definition 8. The Herbrand base of program P is the set of ground instances of the 
atoms formed from predicates, function symbols and constants in P (inventing a new 
constant if P does not contain any constants). 
Definition 9 (see [2]). A logic program P is acyclic if there is an assignment of a 
positive integer to each element of the Herbrand base of P such that, if P’ is the set 
of ground instances of clauses in P, then for every rule in P’ the number assigned to 
the atom in the head of the rule is greater than the number assigned to each atom that 
appears in the body. 
Acyclic programs are surprisingly general [ 21. Note that acyclicity does not preclude 
recursive definitions. It just means that all such definitions have to be well founded. 
Definition 10. An interpretation is an assignment of true or false to each member of 
the Herbrand base. Interpretation M is a stable model [ 181 of logic program P if for 
every ground atom h, h is true in M if and only if h is in P or there is a rule h +- b 
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in P’ such that b is true in M. Conjunction a A b is true in M if both a and b are true 
in M. A negation Ta is true in M if and only if a is not true in M. 
Note that the negation here is the so-called negation-as-failure [ 111. We can use 
negation-as-failure in our knowledge base, although the standard procedural intuition 
does not necessarily hold [ 371. 
Theorem 11 (see [ 21) . An acyclic logic program has a unique stable model. 
Acyclicity is also important for the physical realization of our game theory strategies; 
an agent cannot condition on a value that depends on what it is going to do (see 
Section 5.5). 
In some sense the possible world w, is the stable model of 3 U R(T) ; they assign 
exactly the same truth values to propositions. 
Example 12. Suppose we have ICL theory with C = { {ui, ~2, Q}, {bl , bz}}, and with 
3 = {c +- al A bl, c + a3 A b2, d + al, d +- la2 A bl, e + c, e +- Td}. There are 6 
possible worlds with the following truth assignments: 
WI,, %bl) + ai la2 Ta3 bl Tb:! c d e 
w{uz,b,} t= -al a:! Ta3 61 Tb2 TC -d e 
W{a3,b,} t= Tal la2 a3 bl Tb2 -c d Te 
W{,,.bz) I= al -a2 la3 lb, b2 lc d Te 
W{azrbz} I= la1 a2 Tas Tbl b2 ~c -d e 
W{asbz) I= la1 Ta2 ag lb, b:! c Td e 
Note that there are two sorts of atoms; atomic choices (al,az,a3, bl, b2) and derived 
atoms (c, d, e). The atomic choices that are true in the world are given by the selector 
function for the world (here we have subscripted the worlds with the range of the 
selector function), and there is a world for each selector function. The truth of the 
derived atoms is defined by the rules and the range of the selector function. 
2.3. The multi-agent independent choice logic 
The independent choice logic (ICL) specifies a way to build possible worlds. In order 
to model multi-agent situations, we need to have more structure. In particular we need 
different agents to be able to control different choices. 
Definition 13. A multi-agent independent choice logic theory is a tuple (C,3, A, 
controller, PO), where 
l C, the choice space, is as in Definition 3. 
. 3, the facts, is an acyclic logic program such that no atomic choice unifies with 
the head of any rule. 
. A is a finite set of agents. There is a distinguished agent 0 called “nature”. 
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con,troller is a function from C + A. If controller = a then agent a is said to 
control alternative x. If a E A is an agent, the set of alternatives controlled by a 
is C, = {x EC 1 controller(x) = a}. Note that C = UaEA C,. 
Pa is a function UC0 -+[O,l] suchthatVxECo,~,,,Po(a)=l.* Thatis,for 
each alternative controlled by nature, Pa is a probability measure over the atomic 
choices in the alternative. 
Often, when the context is clear we refer to a multi-agent independent choice logic 
theory simply as an independent choice logic theory. 
The idea is that an agent gets to choose one element from each of the alternatives it 
controls. ‘The alternatives controlled by nature have a probability distribution over them. 
The facts give the consequences of the choices by the agents. 
2.3.1. Rules for utility 
Game theory and decision theory are based on the notion of utility, a cardinal value 
representing the worth to an agent of an outcome or possible world.9 Higher utilities 
reflect preferred worlds. Agents act to increase their (expected) utility. Finding optimal 
strategies becomes trickier when there are multiple agents with competing objectives, 
but the idea of each agent trying to maximise its utility remains. 
Utility is a function of both an agent and a world. Different agents have different 
preferences and so different utilities in the possible worlds. Note that nature (agent 0) 
does not have a utility. 
The logic program can have rules for utiZity( a, u), where utiZity( a, u) is true in a 
possible world if u is the utility for agent a # 0 in that world. 
Definition 14. ICL theory (C, 3, A, controller, PO) is 
l utility consistent for agent a E A where a # 0 if, for each possible world w,, 
w, I= utiZity(a, ~1) A utility(a, 242) implies ui = ~2. The theory is utility consistent 
if it is utility consistent for all agents (other than agent 0). 
l utility complete for agent a E A where a # 0 if, for each possible world w,, there 
is a unique number u such that w, k utiZity( a, u) . The theory is utility complete 
if it is utility complete for all agents (other than agent 0). 
Thus an ICL theory is utility consistent and complete means that the utility relation is a 
function for each possible world. 
We assume that all of the theories are utility consistent and complete. 
8 When x is not discrete, we may need to use an integration rather than summation. To avoid measurability 
and integrability issues, we assume in this paper that all sets are discrete and finite, although the framework 
is not neces,sarily restricted to this case. 
g The existence of a utility function, and the existence of a probability distribution is implied from a set 
of intuitive axioms about rational preferences, such that agents try to maximise expected utilities [49,53]. 
Like most decision and game theory practitioners we take the notion of utility as something that we want to 
represent and use to derive optimal actions for agents. There is a large body of literature about how these 
utilities can be acquired (see e.g., papers in [ 341). 
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Example 15. Continuing Example 12 suppose the rules for utility are: 
utilizy( agent,, 5) t Te 
utility(agent, , 0) +-- e A c 
utility(agent, ,9) +- e A lc 
utility( agent2, 7) + d 
utiZity( agent2, 2) + -d 
Note that, if these are all the rules for utility then the ICL is utility consistent and 
complete for agent1 and agent2 independently of the choice space and the other rules. 
The values for the possible worlds (omitting the false atomic choices) are: 
W{,,,b,} != a1 h c d e utility( agent,, 0) utiZity( ugent2, 7) 
W{a*,h} k a2 h TC -d e utility( agent,, 9) utility( agent2, 2) 
W{Uj,b,} I= a3 h TC d le utility(agentI ,5) utility(agent2, 7) 
W{a,,bz} k a~ b2 yC d le utility(agentl ,5) utility(agent2, 7) 
W{az.bz} k a2 b:! -C ld e utility( agent,, 9) utility(agent2, 2) 
W{aS,b2} k a3 b2 C ld e utility( agent, , 0) utility( agent2, 2) 
2.3.2. Strategies 
Given an ICL theory, agents adopt strategies. These are also often called policies 
for the single-agent case. These strategies specify which atomic choices an agent 
chooses from the alternatives controlled by the agent. In general, a strategy can be 
stochastic where the agent adopts a probability distribution over the alternatives it con- 
trols. 
Definition 16. If (C, 3, A, controller, PO) is an ICL theory and a E A, a f 0, then a 
strategy for agent a is a function P, : UC, + [ 0, 1 ] such that 
VXECn CP,(a)=l. 
aEx 
In other words, for each alternative controlled by agent a, P, is a probability measure 
over the atomic choices in the alternative. 
Definition 17. A pure strategy for agent a is a strategy for agent a such that the range 
of P, is (0, 1). In other words, P, selects a member of each element of C, to have 
probability 1, and the other members thus have probability 0. A pure strategy for agent 
a thus corresponds to a selector function on C,. 
Definition 18. A strategy pro$Ze is a function from agents (other than nature) into 
strategies for the agents. If (+ is a strategy profile and a E A, a # 0 then a(a) is a 
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strategy for agent a. We write a(a) as P,” to emphasize that CT induces a probability 
over the alternatives controlled by agent a. (We also define P&’ = PO.) 
Thus a strategy profile specifies what each agent will do in the sense of specifying 
a probability distribution over their alternatives. Given the probability distribution over 
alternatives, we can derive the expected utility, which is the weighted sum of tbe utilities 
of the worlds (worlds weighted by their probability) : 
Definition 19. If ICL theory (C, 3, A, controller, PO) is utility consistent and complete, 
and CT is a strategy profile, then the expected utility for agent a # 0, under strategy 
profile v is 
(summing over all selector functions r), where 
(this is well defined as the theory is utility consistent and complete), and 
~(cT, T) is the probability of world T under strategy profile g, and u( T, a) is the utility 
of world w, for agent a. 
Note that the expected utility is undefined unless there is a probability distribution 
over every alternative. In particular, for the multi-agent case, there is no such thing as 
the expected utility for an agent of a strategy for that agent; the utility for that agent 
depends on the strategies of the other agents as well. 
Each agent wants to choose a strategy that maximise its (expected) utility. For the 
single-agent, finite choice (i.e., a finite number of finite alternatives} case, this definition 
is str~glitforw~d. Each of their (finite number of) strategies has an expected utility, 
and so they can choose a strategy with a maximal expected utility. For the multiple 
agent case, an agent has to consider what other agents will choose, and their choice 
depends on the first agent’s choice. How to choose strategies has been well studied in 
game theory [ 17,32,53]. We can mirror the definitions of game theory; for example, we 
can define the Nash ~uilibrium and Pareto optimal (both of which reduce to maximum 
expected utility in the single-agent case) as follows: 
Definitim 20. Given utility consistent and complete ICL theory (C, 3, d, controller, 
PO), strategy profile (+ is a Nash Equilibrium if no agent can increase its utility by 
unilaterally deviating from cr. Formally, CT is a Nash equilibrium if for all agents a f A, 
if cr, is a strategy profile such that a&a’) = rr(a’) for all a’ + a then s(a, a,) < 
44 a). 
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In other words, no strategy profile crO that is the same as strategy profile cr for all 
agents other than a is better for a than U. That is, a cannot be better off by unilaterally 
deviating from (+. 
One of the fundamental results of game theory is that every finite game has at least 
one Nash equilibrium [ 17,321. In general you need non-pure (randomised) strategies 
for the equilibrium to exist. For a single agent in an uncertain environment, a Nash 
equilibrium is an optimal decision theoretic strategy. 
Definition 21. Given utility consistent and complete ICL theory (C, 3, A, controller, 
PO), strategy profile u is Pareto optimal if no agent can do better without some other 
agents doing worse. Formally, CT is Pareto optimal if for all strategies (+‘, if there exists 
an agent a E A such that E(U, u’) > E(U, (+) then there exists an agent u’ E A such 
that ~(a’,&) < &(~‘,a). 
Other definitions from game theory can also be given in the logic of this paper. 
What we are adding to game theory is the use of a logic program to model the agents 
and the environment, and to provide a way to express independence (in the same 
way that probabilistic Horn abduction [ 36 ] can be used to represent the independence 
assumptions of Bayesian networks). 
Example 22. Here we show how to represent Example 1. In the facts we axiomatise 
utility (this is a utility consistent and complete axiomatisation for both the kicker and 
the goalie) : 
utility( kicker, 1) +- goal. 
utility( kicker, 0) + -goal. 
utility(goulie, 1) +- goal. 
utility( goalie, 0) + ygoul. 
In the facts we axiomatise when a goal is scored: lo 
goal c kicks(D) A jumps( D) A goulifsamedir. 
goal +-- kicks( left) A jumps( right) A goul_z~_kl_jr. 
goal +-- kicks( right) A jumps( left) A goulifkr-jl. 
In C, we have one alternative owned by kicker, namely {kicks(right), kicks(lef)}, one 
alternative owned by goalie, namely Gjumps( right), jumps( left)}, and three alterna- 
tives owned by nature, namely: {goulifsamedir, no-goal&same_dir}, (goalifAl_jr, 
no-goulifkl_jr}, and {goalif-kr_jl, no-goulifkr-jl} with Po(goalifsume_dir) = 0.9, 
PO (goulifkl-jr) = 0.1 and PO (goulif_kr_jl) = 0.2. 
lo The atoms goal_if_samedir, goal_$kl_jr and goaljfkrjl are independent causal hypotheses [361. These 
are introduced so that we can have normal logical rules, and independent al ernatives. 
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Suppose that the goalie is to choose a strategy with ps = Pgon/&ump( right)) and the 
kicker is to choose a strategy with m( = Pkicker( kick( ~~g~~~ ) . In this setup, there are four 
cases wh:ere goal is true; these cases are exclusive, and so we can sum the probabilities. 
Thus, 
~(@Xd) =pkpgo.9f(1 -pk)(l -pg)o.9+ (l-pk)pgo.l+pk(l -pg)o.2. 
The problem for each agent is to choose their probability to maximise their expected 
utility. So the kicker has to choose pk to maximise the probability of a goal and the 
goalie has to choose ps to minimize the probability of a goal. 
In a Nash equilibrium, neither agent can improve its expected utility by unilaterally 
changing its strategies. Take the kicker’s point of view. If there is a randomised strategy, 
then, as the randomised strategy is a linear combination of the payoffs of the pure 
strategies, the pure strategies must have the same values (otherwise the kicker can 
improve its utility by choosing the pure strategy with the higher value). In a randomized 
equilibrium, the payoff for kicking right and kicking left must be equal. The payoff for 
kicking right is the above formula with pk = 1, the payoff for kicking left is the formula 
with pk == 0. These are equal when: 
p,o.9+ (1 -ps)O.2= (1 -p,)O.9+psO.l. 
Solving for pg we can derive pg = 7/15. Thus the only time that the kicker would 
consider a mixed strategy is when the goalie jumps right with probability 7f15. Us- 
ing similar reasoning, we can show that the only randomis~ equilib~~m for the 
goalie is when pk = S/15. It is easy to show there are no pure strategy equilibria. 
There is a unique Nash equilibrium with pg = 7/15, pk = 8/15. Under this equi- 
librium the probability of a goal is 79/150 = 0.52666; thus the kicker has a slight 
advantage (which should be expected, as the goalie is slightly worse when it jumps 
left). 
3. Embedding other formalisms in the ICL 
In this section we show how influence diagrams, Markov decision problems (MDPs) 
and the strategic form of games can be represented in the ICL. We will show rather 
direct embeddings of these formalisms. 
Another embedding should be noted, and that is that probabilistic Horn abduction 
[ 361, a -restriction of ICL (with only choices by nature, no negation as failure and 
more resirictions on the rules), can directly represent Bayesian networks [ 361. The 
embedding of influence diagrams is based on this embedding. 
3.1. Representing influence diagrams 
An influence diagram or decision network [23] is a graphical representation of a 
decision problem. (See Section 1.4.) We show how to translate an influence diagram 
into a (single-agent) ICL theory such that there is an isomorphism between the policies 
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of the influence diagram and the strategies of the ICL, with corresponding expected 
utilities equal. We only consider influence diagrams with a single value node (any other 
influence diagram can be mapped onto this representation). 
Definition 23. An influence diagram is a tuple (N, A, 0, P, U) such that: 
l N is a finite set of nodes, partitioned into the set R of random nodes, the set D 
of decision nodes and the singleton set {V} containing the value node. Random 
nodes are drawn as ovals, decision nodes as rectangles and the value node as a 
diamond. 
l A c N x N is the set of arcs such that (N, A) forms an acyclic directed graph 
(DAG). If (ni, nj) E A then ni is said to be a parent of nj and nj is a child of ni. 
Define r(n) = {m 1 (m, n) E A}. That is, r(n) is the set of parents of node n. 
We assume that the value node does not have any children. 
l 0 is a function from RU D into sets of variable values, O(n), called the frame of 
node n, is the set of values that the variable associated with node n can take. We 
extend 0 to cover sets of nodes by O({na,. . .,n,}> = f&no) x ... x f2(n,). 
l P is a probability function over the random nodes given their parents. That is, for 
each x E R, P( x = u 1 n-(x) = w) is a non-negative number such that 
VW c P(x=/J 1 T(X) =w> = 1 
&O(X) 
The probability is often written simply as P(x 1 n-(x)) where the values u E O(x) 
and w E a( r( x) ) are derived from context. 
l U : L~(TT( V)) + Iw. U is the utility function that gives the utility for different 
values of the parents of V. 
The parents of a random node represent probabilistic dependence (as is a Bayesian 
network [ 351). The parents of the value node represent functional dependence; the 
utility only depends on the values of the parents of the value node. The parents of a 
decision node represent information available; one value for each parent of the decision 
node will be known when the decision is made. 
If di E D, a decision function for di is a function Si : fl( r( di)) -+ O(di). If the 
decision nodes are (dl, . . . , dk), a policy is a tuple (St,. . . ,8k) where Si is a decision 
function for di. 
Policy S induces a conditional probability Pa on the decision variables defined by 
Ps(di I~(411 = 
1, if si(r(di)) = di, 
Suppose R U D = {XI,. . . , x,}. The joint distribution given policy 6 is: 
PS(Xl9. *,Xn> = n P(Xi I r(Xi)) X n PS(Xj 1 T(Xj)) 
X&R X,ED 
(what is meant by Pa should be clear from context). 
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Fig. 2. An influence diagram. 
The expected utility of policy 8 is given by 
X,.....X” X&R XjED 
where we are summing over all of the values of variables XI,. . . , xn. 
Example 24. Fig. 2 shows an influence diagram with two decision nodes ta and d, 
four randlom nodes a, as, b, bs, and one value node utility. The intuition for this diagram 
is that there is one decision d to be made that depends on a and b. bs is a noisy sensor 
for b and as is a sensor for a that can be controlled by ta. 
Associated with the influence diagram (not shown in the diagram) is a frame for 
each variable, and the conditional probability table for each random variable given its 
parents. These probability tables for the random nodes are a major source of complexity 
as their size is exponential in the number of parents of the node. 
Suppose the frames are as follows: 
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fl( tu) = {high, low} 
f2( a) = {low, medium, high} 
O(as) = (PO& neg} 
Q(b) = {PO& neg} 
iI = (pas, neg} 
fin(d) = {dl,dz,d3} 
There are ten probability distributions to be assigned; one for a, six for as (one for each 
assignment of values to a and tu, such as P(us = pos 1 a = low A ta = high)), one for b 
and two for bs. 
The mapping of an influence diagram into a (single-agent) ICL theory is as follows: l1 
l Random variable xi has value vi is represented as the proposition xi( ui). l2 
l Random variable Xi with ki parents xi,, . . . , xi4 is represented as a rule and expo- 
nentially (in ki) many alternatives. There is one rule: 
Xi(K) +Xi,(Xl) A”‘Axi,,(Kkl) ACi(XtK~9...,Q). 
For each assignment of values to the Xij, that is for each (Ui],. . . , uik,) E L?( Xi1 ) x 
. . . x fl( Xi,, ) there is an alternative controlled by nature: 
{Ci(ul*uig>. . .,uit,),...,Ci(u~,uil,...,ui~,)) 
where n(xi) = {ut , . . . , u,.}. 
The probability of each atomic choice is the value of the corresponding conditional 
probability: 
PO(Ci(~lv uil T. . .,Uiti))=P(Xi=lll (Xi, =Ui~,.s.,Xik, =Uiz+). 
The conditional probabilities on the right-hand side are provided as part of the 
influence diagram. Note that under this mapping there are the same number of 
alternatives as there are rows in the probability tables for Xi, and the same number 
of probabilities are provided. 
In many cases the probability can be represented more compactly. In particular 
this occurs when some parents are irrelevant in the context of values to other 
variables [ 71. 
l Value node with parents Xi,, . . . , Xiti is represented as a rule of the form: 
Utikty(Ugent, U) t Xi, (LJ~,) A . . . A Xiti(Uik,) 
for each (Oil, . . e,U&) E fl(Xi,) X "' x f2(Xiki), where u = U(Ui,,. . . Toi,). AS 
with chance nodes, in many cases the value function can be represented more 
compactly than this. 
” The mapping for random nodes is the same as the representation of Bayesian networks in probabilistic 
Horn abduction [ 361. 
‘* We have not used the standard probabilistic notation of xi = U; because logicians usually mean something 
different by equality, namely that two terms denote the same object. 
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l Decision variable xi with ki parents xi,, . . . , xiii is represented as a rule and 
exp~~nenti~ly (in ki) many alternatives. There is one rule: 
Xi(F) +-Xi,(Q) A***nx,i(K*i) ACi(ti,K,,...,vl,). 
For each (ui, , . . . 9 Uix,) E fJ(XiL > x ’ . - x L?(xj+) there is an alternative controlled 
by the agent: 
{Ci(Ul,Uilt-. * ,uik,),...,Ci(uT,uil’***‘ui~~)) 
where L!(xi) = (~1,. . . , u,}. Just as the influence diagram policy has to choose a 
value for each value of the parents we have to choose a value for each alternative. 
There is a one to one mapping between the alternatives and the values of the 
parents of a node. 
Example 25. Continuing Example 24, with the influence diagram of Fig. 2, variable tu 
has no parents, therefore there is one value to be chosen. This can be represented as 
having {t,z( hi), ta( low)} E Ct. There are 8 independent choices to be made for d (one 
for each assignment of values to its parents). This can be represented as the rule: 
d(DV) +-- ta(7-V) A as(AV) A bs(BV) A d~#es(D~~A~BV) 
with 
{d~7es(dt,~AYBV),d~~es(dz,~AYBV),dd~es(ds,~AYBV)) E Cl 
for each value of TV, AV, BV. 
Theorem 26. Given an influence diagram ID and the corresponding ZCL theory, dejined 
by the matpping above, there is a correspondence between the policies of the injuence 
diagram and the pure strategies of the ICL theory. The corresponding policies and 
strategies have the same expected ~ti~i~. 
Proof. A policy of an influence diagram specifies a decision function for each decision 
node. Each decision function is a function from the values of the parent to the values 
of the nodes. A decision function, S; corresponds to the selection of 
from the corresponding alternative. It is easy to see that different policies correspond to 
different s.elections, and that different selections correspond to different policies. 
The expected utility of the influence diagram policy S is: 
e(S)= x n P(Xi 1 d&)1 x n pS(xj IQdXjl) X u(4V)) 
xt,...,x,, .riER XjED 
= x n pO(Ci(Xiv~(Xi))) X r]: f?(Cj(X,j,71.(xj))) x u(~(V))r 
x,....,x. xiER .TjED 
where ci(.Xi, V( Xi) ) has the obvious mining, and Pt is the probability induced by the 
policy. This is the expected utility of the PHA theory for the same policy. 
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3.2. Markov decision processes 
Markov decision processes [44] are models of single-agent stochastic sequential 
decision problems where a notion of state conveys all of the information about the past 
history. 
A Markov decision process is defined in terms of a set S of states, a set A of actions, 
a state transition function P(sl 1 so, a) which specifies the probability that s1 is the 
state resulting from carrying out action a in state s, and a reward function R( so, a, q ) 
that specifies the reward obtained when action a is carried out in so and the resulting 
state is ~1. 
A stationary policy is a selection of an action for each state; what the agent does at 
any time depends on the state. 
We can represent the choice function for an agent, assuming we want stationary 
policies, as: 
where do( A, S) is true if the agent will do action A in state S and A = {al,. . . , a,} is 
the set of available actions. The agent gets to choose what it does for each state. If we 
want a non-stationary policy (i.e., the policy depends on the time or stage), we add a 
time parameter to do. 
We also axiomatise the state transition function, which specifies how states transform 
under actions: 
state( S’, s(T) ) +- state( S, T) A do( A, S) A st_trans( S, A, S’) , 
where state( S, T) is true if the system is in state S at time T, and st_trans( S, A, S’) is 
true if action A transforms state S into state S’. This is a stochastic transition: 
VSVA {st_trans(S,A,sg),...,st_trans(S,A,s,)}ECo, 
where {SO, . . . , s,} is the set of all states. Note that these are alternatives controlled by 
nature. PO (st_trans( S, A, S’) ) is the probability that state S’ will be the result of carrying 
out action A in state S. 
A reward function can be defined in terms of rules of the form 
reward( ri, T) c state(si, T) 
for each state Si and for some number ri. 
We typically do not want to write Markov decision processes by explicitly referring 
to the states, but instead want to divide the state into propositions (or random variables) 
[ 121. This can reduce the size of the probabilistic assessment necessary. This can be 
reduced further by the use of rules; these allows us to express structured probability 
distributions concisely. This concise specification can be exploited for computational 
gain; Boutilier et al. [5] exploit the rule (or tree) structure of probability tables for 
computational gain for MDPs. The ICL representation also allows for the concise ax- 
iomatisation in logic, with a well defined semantics, of the dynamics of the system. 
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This is similar to Kanazawa [24], but incorporates a particular, and we claim useful, 
probability independence. 
Example 27. Let us axiomatise the structured MDP example of Boutilier et al. [5] 
in the independent choice logic. Essentially we can convert the trees into rules, but 
we do not need separate rules for each action (which is exactly the frame prob- 
lem [31]). 
In this example, there are six state propositions: Zoc_ofs(T), the location of the robot 
is at the office (as opposed to being at the caf6) at time T; wet(T), the robot is wet; 
umbrellaiT), the robot is carrying an umbrella; ruining(T), it is raining; &c(T), the 
robot has coffee; and uhc(T), the user has coffee. 
There are four actions: go(T), go to opposite location; buyC( T), buy coffee; delC( T), 
deliver coffee; and getU(T), get coffee. 
We can specify the dynamics using logic, for example, the following clauses define 
wet and hcu: 
wet(T+ 1) t wet(T) 
wet(T + 1) + go(T) A ruining(T) A ~umbreZZu(T) 
hcu(T + 1) +-- h(T) 
hcu( T + 1) c deZC( T) A 4cu( T) A loc_o#( T) A hcr( T) A deECsucceeds( T) 
where VT {deZCsucceeds(T), delCfuiZs( T)} E Co, and VT Po(delCsucceeds(T)) = 0.8. 
We can also define the reward function using rules: 
rewurd( 1.0, T) t /KU(T) A lwet(T) 
rewurd(0.9, T) t /KU(T) A wet(T) 
rewurd(0.1, T) c +zcu(T) A Twet(T) 
rewurd(O.O, T) +- -&cu(T) A wet(T) 
For finite horizon problems, the value can be specified in terms of rules. For example, 
vulueto( R + U, T + 1) +- rewurd( R, T) A vulueto( U, T). 
vuzutrto( 0,O). 
where vul’ueto( VT) is true if V is the sum of the rewards up to time T. 
For infiinite horizon problems, it is not so simple. You could imagine writing, for the 
discounted reward function [ 441: 
vuluc?( R + U x y, T) +- reward( R, T) A vulue(U, T + 1)) 
where y is the discount factor. However, such rules are problematic as the recursion 
does not terminate. It is probably better to define the value external to the logic. Having 
the specifcation of the value function separate from the other parts of the problem 
specification, as is traditionally done in MDPs, does not seem to be too problem- 
atic. 
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3.3. The strategic form of a game 
The most direct connection of the ICL is to the strategic form of a game (see 
Section 5.5 for a comparison to the extensive form of a game). 
The strategic form of a game [ 17,321 is a tuple (A, .X’, U) where 
l A is a non-empty set of players (agents), 
0 2 is a function from agents into non-empty sets (of pure strategies). Thus _Z( a) 
is the set of all pure strategies for agent a. 
0 u is a function 
@:A--+ (G2A2(a) --+lR). 
Suppose A = (~1,. . . a,,} and a E A. u(a) is a function that given an n-tuple of 
strategies, one for each agent in A, returns the utility for agent a under this strategy 
profile. Thus 24 (a) ( (go,, . . . , CT,,)) where gai E .X( ai) is the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility for agent a when each player ai chooses strategy ohi. 
The general idea is that each player chooses a strategy which specifies what it will do 
under all contingencies. Following a complete play (specified by each player’s strategy) 
each player receives a utility. 
Note that there are two different forms which we treat as the same here. One is where 
nature is not an agent, and all of the payoffs are expectations (averaging over nature’s 
choices). The second is where nature is a player, and has a probability distribution over 
its strategies; this is called the Bayesian form of a game [ 171, where the players have 
partial information about nature’s choice. The private information about nature’s move is 
called the player’s type. The Bayesian form of a game assumes that each player chooses 
its strategy after it learns its type. Such a distinction is beyond the scope of this paper, 
as we do not consider how or when strategies are computed (for example, whether they 
are computed online or offline). 
The ICL can be seen as a particular epresentation for the strategic or the Bayesian 
form of a game. The set of agents is the same. We divide the space of strategies for 
players into independent choices (i.e, we allow more structure in the strategy space) 
and use a logic program to axiomatise the u function. 
There is a direct mapping of the strategic or Bayesian form of a game into an ICL 
theory: strategic game (A, z‘, U) is mapped into the multi-agent ICL theory (C, F, d, 
controller, PO), where A is the same set, C is the set 
{{ffo(ai,a,i) 1 ani is a strategy for aj} 1 ad E A}, 
where do( ai, ohi) is an atom that says that agent ai is adopting strategy a;, (all we 
need is a name for each strategy), controller is the function {do( ai, a,,), . . .) I-+ ai, PO 
is the probability distribution over types (for the Bayesian model of a game) and 3 is 
is set of rules of the form 
utiZity(a, util) +- cio( at, oh, ) A . . . A do( a,, CT+), 
where util = u(a) ((a,,, . . . , a,,,)). 
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This mapping has trivialised the fact that there is a lot hidden in the structure of 
the strategies. We have assumed we can name the strategies and say what follows from 
them. For simple games we may be able to, but for most realistic situations we want 
to be able: to specify the choices at a lower level of detail, and be able to control the 
selection of components of strategies. The consequence of a number of different agents 
choosing strategies hould involve reasoning about the building blocks of the strategies 
(what is done under what circumstances), and reasoning about the dynamics of the 
domain to determine the consequences of the actions. 
4. The dynamic ICL 
The ICI, presented so far is only good at representing problems where the the decision 
problem c.an be statically expressed (even if the problem to be solved involves dynamics 
and change). Like the strategic form of a game, the building blocks of the strategies 
have to be constructed ahead of time. For example, for the influence diagram mapping 
we had to create an alternative corresponding to each assignment of values to parents, 
rather than creating the appropriate rules for defining the policy on the fly. 
There are a number of problems with this: 
l What the agent will do (or attempt o do) is buried within the representation. 
The alternatives are at a lower level than the choices faced by the agent; they 
spec:ify what the agent will do under each contingency. While we can represent 
the dynamic structure structure of reasoning and acting, the fo~alism presented 
so far gives us no help in doing so. 
l We have to create an alternative for each independent choice that the agent could 
make; that is, we have to a priori divide up information states for the decision. The 
problem is that the a priori division needs to be at the finest level of detail. For 
example, al~ough some decision d may have much info~ation available when 
the decision is made (in the influence diagram d may have many parents), the 
specification of what the agent should do may not require all of the distinctions of 
the information state. There may be a more concise encoding of the policy. Just 
as we have used rules as a concise specification of probability distributions, we 
may like to express the policy for an agent as rules. 
o We may want to create alternatives on the fly; what options are available to an 
agent and what information it knows may depend on the context, and it may be 
more economical to create alternatives as needed, rather than having to anticipate 
all of them as part of a strategy. 
l We want to reason about the program the agent used to compute an action rather 
than just the action itself [48]. 
We want to build a representation upon a more natural specification of dynamic systems. 
We will extend the ICL to the dynamic ICL logic that is slightly more complicated, but 
arguably more natural. We model the dynamics of the world rather than the structure of 
the choices. 
The dynamic ICL is more like a representation for the extensive form of a game 
than a representation for the strategic form of a game; it will tell us how to construct 
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the appropriate game/decision tree (see Section 5.5). This will be done without losing 
the advantages of the ICL, namely, the embedding of the independence of Bayesian 
networks, the ability to represent structured decision tables, and the use of logical 
variables. 
We build the theory upon a general model of agents interacting in an environment. 
This is important as it places the ICL within a wider theoretical context, and introduces 
the notions of traces, transductions, state and sensing. 
4.1. Dynamical systems 
Modelling dynamical systems [ 13,291 is common in many areas of science, from 
mechanical engineering to economics to ecology. 
We assume a time structure 7, that is totally ordered and has a metric over intervals. 
7 can either be continuous or discrete; for this paper we will consider discrete time. 
(See [39] for a development of continuous time in this framework.) A trace is a 
function from 7 into some domain A. 
A transduction is a function from (input) traces into (output) traces that is “causal” 
in the sense that the output at time t can only depend in inputs at times t’ where t’ < t 
(i.e., the output at some time is a function of the input history up to that time). An 
agent will be a specification of a transduction. Transductions form a general abstraction 
of dynamic agents and dynamic systems in general [39,47,57], although they do not 
adequately handle the case of nondeterministic agents. l3 
The state of an agent is that information that needs to be remembered in order for 
the output to be a function of the state and the current inputs. At one extreme a state 
can contain the entire history of the agent. At the other extreme an agent can have no 
state and just react to its current inputs. 
4.2. Agent structure 
So far we have modelled agents by naming them and specifying which choices they 
control. It helps to do more than this; we want to provide some structure that makes it 
easy to model actual agents. Not every logic program and set of assignments of agents 
to choices will make sense. Agents have input and outputs; there are some values that 
they have no access to, and some internal values that only they can access. 
We will model agents as a logic program that specifies how the outputs are entailed 
by certain inputs [ 391. This logic program can use the internal values and sense values 
but cannot use those values the agent has no access to (i.e., cannot sense or otherwise 
determine). 
l3 With deterministic agents, only the input history is needed. Nondeterministic agents (agents need to be 
nondeterministic if they inhabit an environment with other (competing) agents, or if they have limited 
memory), need to be able to recall their inputs as well as choice commitments made. For example, for an 
agent with no inputs to implement (a; b)((c;d) where “I” is nondeterministic choice and “;” is sequential 
composition, at the second time step the agent has to be able to recall what it chose in the first time 
step. 
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In modelling agents we have to be careful about a number of things: 
33 
What are the inputs and what are the outputs? When we have-noisy sensors and 
actuators with slop and failure, we cannot condition on the values in the world, 
but only on what our sensors tell us. We have to be able to model what an agent 
can observe (and how it relates to the world), and what an agent controls (and 
how it relates to what the agent actually does). 
We have to make sure that the agent can actually carry out the policy specified for 
the agent. An executable policy cannot depend on events the agent cannot observe, 
or are not under the agent’s control. 
The logic programs are models of the agents. They are not the agents themselves. 
We want to be able to model many different sorts of agents, both natural and 
artificial. We want to be able to model agents that are implements as simple 
logic circuits or in some traditional programing language, for example. We want 
to use the same language to model agents we design, agents that our agent may 
encounter, and the environment. We also want to be able to model how long the 
agent will take to execute an action (including the time to execute the program to 
choose the action) [483. This does not mean we could not run this specification 
to make an agent (but it will be a different agent, for example, if we forward 
chain on the axioms than if we backward chain on the axioms; they will have very 
different timing properties). 
We distinguish the “controller” and the “plant” of an agent [ 131. (See Fig. 3.) The 
controEZer is that part that we have to optimize; it receives digital signals (“‘observa- 
tions”) and outputs digital “controls” or “actuator commands”. The plant or body is the 
physical embodiment of the agent that includes input devices such as cameras, micro- 
phones, radio receivers as well as wheels, limbs and transmitters. The plant receives 
“percepts” from the environment (e.g., sound, light, radio signals), and sends observa- 
tions to the controller. The observations are usually correlated with the percepts received, 
but are typically not identical as sensors are noisy. The plant also receives controls from 
the controller and makes actions in the environment (e.g., actually moving, sending 
messages). 
Multiple agents will all interact hrough the environment; he only way for agents to 
communicate is through the environment I4 and they a11 act in the environment (as in 
Fig. 3). There may be many agents, all of which carry out actions in the environment 
and receive percepts from the environment. 
As far as8 the outside world (including other agents) is concerned, an agent receives 
percepts such as messages, light, sounds, etc., and performs actions such as moving 
limbs, sending messages. Thus other agents will tend to group the controller and the 
plant together as “the agent” (or “the robot” for physical implementations). 
As far as the controller is concerned, it can group the plant and the environment 
together. It receives observations, and outputs controls. The distinction between the plant 
and the environment is essentially arbitrary; we usually make the distinction because we 
often build controllers for particular plants, but for more general environments. While 
I4 If there is some form of direct communi~tion channel, then this is also modelbd as part of the environment. 
This makes modelling more uniform and allows us to model noise and failure in communication. 
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Fig. 3. An agent acting in an environment. 
the distinction between the controller and the plant may seem to be arbitrary to an 
outside observer, when building an agent we have to commit to a particular division in 
order to construct a controller. (Typically we want a hierarchy of controllers and plants 
[ 1, 10,55], but this is beyond the scope of this paper.) 
For the rest of this paper we take the controller’s point of view; we assume a 
controller receives definitive observations and can issue controls to the plant. The plant 
will be modelled as part of the environment. In particular, uncertainty in observations 
(observations may not always reflect what is true in the environment) will be modelled 
in terms of rules that depend on the percepts as well as nature’s choices. 
4.3. Agent specification module 
The agent specification module takes the controller’s point of view; the inputs will 
be observations and the outputs will be controls. The agent will be able to condition on 
the observations and will need to choose values for the controls. 
Agent specification modules will allow us to modularise our knowledge, and use 
common computer science techniques like information hiding, abstract data types and 
modular program design. We will generalise the ICL to the “dynamic ICL” through 
the use of agent specification modules; this will allow a more concise representation of 
decision problems. 
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Definition 28. An agent speci$cation module for agent a # 0, written ASM,, is a tuple 
(C,, 0,) T) where 
l C, i:s a set of alternatives controlled by a. This will be the set of possible actu- 
ator commands for the agent; the agent can attempt to “do” one of the actuator 
commands in each element of C,. 
l c3,, the observables, is a set of sets of ground atomic formulae. Elements of 0, 
are called observation alternatives; elements of observation alternatives are called 
atomic observations. 
l T, the observable function, is a function T : C, -+ 20a. The idea is that when the 
agent decides which element of alternative x E C, to choose, it will have observed 
one atomic observation from each observation alternative in r(x). Elements of 
r(x) are the information available to the agent when it has to choose an element 
of /1’. r(x) corresponds to the parents of a decision node x in an influence 
diagram. 
The following definition mirrors the analogous definition from game theory: 
Definition 29. Agent a has pelfect recall (or is no-forgetting) if it remembers all of 
its previous observations and previous actions. Formally this means that the element 
of C, are totally ordered and if XI E C,, x2 E C,, x1 < ~2 then XI E 74x2) and 
T(XI) c rTT(x2). 
A dynamic ICL theory consists of an agent specification module for each agent, and 
a logic program, plus stochastic choices to axiomatise what follows from the agent’s 
choices: 
Definition 30. A dynamic independent choice logic theory is a tuple (A,&, 30, 
PO, ASM) , where 
l A is a finite set of agents containing a distinguished agent 0 called “nature”, 
l CO, nature’s choice space, is a choice space with alternatives controlled by nature, 
l &, .nature’s facts, is a logic program such that no atomic choice unifies with the 
head of any rule, 
0 PO is a function UC0 -+ [0, l] such that V,y E CO CcrEX Po(cr) = 1, 
l ASM is a function on A - (0) such that ASM, is an agent specification module 
for a.gent a, 
such that & is acyclic with an acyclic ordering where Vu E A, Vx E C,, Vcz E x, 
VO E r(,y), V’a’ E 0, a’ < a in the acyclic ordering. That is, there is an acyclic 
ordering where the actions are after their corresponding observables. 
Note that (& CO, PO) will correspond to a particular (stochastic) strategy for nature 
(see Definition 37). It is a specification of what choices nature will make. This specifies 
the stocha:stic dynamics of the system. 
We have to make sure that the observables for each agent really cover the possibilities 
and really are alternatives. 
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Definition 31. Given dynamic ICL theory (d,Co,Fo, Po,ASM), set r of ground for- 
mulae is non-exclusive if there exists a choice function r on lJaEA C, and there exists 
at E r, cry2 E r, (~1 # LYE such that R(r) UFii b a1 A (~2. Otherwise r is exclusive. 
r is covering if for every choice function r on UaEA C,, there is cx E r such that 
R(7) u & t_ cy. 
For example, every choice alternative is exclusive and covering. Every set of the form 
{a, la} is exclusive and covering. A less trivial example is: given C = {{a, b}, {c, d}, 
{e, f}}, and F = {g c a, h c b A c, i c b A d}, {g, h, i} is an exclusive and covering 
set. If g c e were added to F then {g, h, i} would no longer be exclusive. 
Definition 32. A dynamic ICL theory is observation consistent if for every a E A, 
every element of 0, is exclusive with respect to the dynamic ICL theory. A dynamic 
ICL theory is observation complete if for every a E A, every element of 0, is cover- 
ing. 
The above definitions are to make sure that we can treat the elements of 0 as random 
variables. Unlike elements of C, they are not exclusive and covering by definition. We 
will always require a theory to be observation consistent, but, when we have negation 
as failure in the logic [ 371, we will not require the theory to be observation complete 
(there may be an extra, unnamed element of each element of 0). Note that observation 
consistency is not a severe restriction; we can always make 0 a set of singleton sets, 
but then we cannot exploit the structure of observations. 
Example 33. For example, suppose we have {high, medium, low} as an observation 
alternative. We want the theory to never allow choices of the agents to entail both high 
and medium. This means that a strategy can be specified as a function from this set into 
actuator settings. If these values were not exclusive, we could make sets {high, digh}, 
(medium, lmedium}, and {low, llow} into observation alternatives (which are each 
exclusive and covering), but this would mean a strategy would be a function from the 
cross product of these into actuator settings. If {high, medium, low} is not covering, we 
also have to cover the case Thigh A Tmedium A 4ow in defining a strategy. 
The general idea is that the agent will always observe one element of each member 
of 7r( x) before choosing one element of x. The acyclicity restrictions and the observa- 
tion completeness and consistency requirements above ensure this temporal ordering is 
possible. 
In this paper we assume all our theories are observation consistent and complete. 
4.4. Pure strategies 
A pure strategy is a specification of what an agent will do based on what it observes. 
This strategy is represented as a logic program. There are restrictions on the logic 
program to ensure an agent cannot condition on values to which it does not have 
access. 
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Definition 34. If (C,, O,, 7r0) is an agent specification module for agent a E A, then a 
pure strategy for agent a is a logic program 30 such that: 
30 is acyclic with an acyclic ordering such that, for every x E C,, every element 
of each element of rrO( x) is before every element of x. That is, the agent can 
observe before making the decision. 
For every x E C,, and for every selection function rrcX) on r(x), there is a 
unique (Y E x that is true in the unique stable model of 3a U R( 7,~~)). That is, 
whatever is observed, the logic program specifies what the agent will do. 
The heads of rules in 30 only unify with either local atoms (that do not unify with 
atoms in the agent specification module of any other agent or in 30) or members 
of choice alternatives in x0. Thus 3Q can only be used to imply alternatives owned 
by agent a, perhaps with some local atoms as intermediaries. 
For each x E C,, the only formulae that can appear in the bodies of rules in 3a to 
prove an element of x are: elements of members of V(X), local atoms and atoms 
whose definition does not depend on the choices of other agents (and formulae 
built from these). While we do not want to restrict the complexity of programs 
to compute the choice from an element of x, the choice cannot depend on values 
that the agent cannot observe or otherwise compute. 
Thus a strategy for an agent is just a program to specify what the agent will do based 
on what information it receives. 
Definition 35. Given a dynamic ICL theory, a (pure) strategy profile is a selection of 
one (pure) strategy for each agent (other than nature). Thus a strategy profile is a logic 
program J ‘F = UaEA 30 that specifies what each agent will attempt to do. 
There are two (equivalent) ways to define the semantics. One it to have a possible 
world for each selection of an element from each alternative controlled by nature, and 
to have 3 specify what is true in each world. In this case, the probability of a world is 
independent of the strategy, but a strategy profile specifies what is true in each world. 
The second is to have a possible world for each selection of one element from each 
alternative. In this case, what is true in a world does not depend on the strategy profile 
chosen, but the probability of a world does. The second has many possible worlds with 
zero probability that were not created in the first scenario. We will define the first 
method formally here. 
Definition 36. If dynamic ICL theory (A, Co, 30, Po,ASM) is utility complete, and 3 
is a pure :;trategy profile, then the expected utility of strategy profile 3 for agent a is 
e(u9.3) = Cp(7) x U(7,U,3) 
(summing over all selector functions r on Cc) where 
u(7,6r,3) =u if R(7) U3kutility(a,u) 
(this is well defined as the theory is utility complete), and 
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P(7) = J-J Po(dx)) 
xeo 
~(7, a, 3) is the utility of world w, for agent a under strategy profile .7=. p(7) is the 
probability of world 7. 
4.5. Stochastic strategies 
As in the goal kick example above, it is often desirable for agents to adopt random 
strategies. In this section we define random (stochastic) strategies. The general idea is 
that a random strategy is a probability distribution over pure strategies. 
Definition 37. If (C,, Oa, TV) is an agent specification module for agent a E A, then a 
(stochastic) strategy for agent a is a tuple (3,) CL, Pa) where CL is a choice space whose 
atomic choices do not appear outside of this strategy, P, is a probability distribution over 
each element of CL (i.e., ‘dx E CA, V’a E x, 0 6 P,(a) < 1 and CaEX P(a) = l), 
and F is a logic program such that for all selector functions r, on CA, .F U R( 7,) is a 
pure strategy (the element of ‘R( ra) will be local atoms in the strategy). 
Example 38. Suppose ({{q,down, left)}, {{high, medium, low}}, T), where r( {up, 
down, left}) = {{high,medium, low}} is an agent specification module for agent a. 
That is, a can do one of {up, down, left}, and when it has to act, it will know which of 
{high, medium, low} is true. One stochastic strategy could have facts: 
up +-- high A uh, 
down +- high A dh, 
left t high A Zh, 
up t medium A urn, 
down + medium A dm, 
left t low, 
choice space CA = { {uh, dh, Zh}, { um,dm}}, and P, given by P,(uh) = 0.7, P,(dh) = 
0.2, P,(Zh) =O.l, PO(um) = 0.6, and P,(mh) =0.4. 
Definition 39. A strategy profile (+ is an assignment of a stochastic strategy for each 
agent (i.e., for each a E A, a(a) is a stochastic strategy). If u is a strategy profile, 
define .Fz to be the first component of ~(a), Cz to be the second component of a( a), 
and P,” to be the third component of c+(a). 
It remains to define the expected value of a strategy profile. 
Definition 40. If dynamic ICL theory (A,&, .Fa, Po,ASM) is utility consistent and 
complete, and u is a stochastic strategy profile, then the expected utility (+ for agent a is 
c(a,g) = CP( 7,gl x 47,a,(+) 
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(summing over all selector functions T on Co U lJaEA C,“) where 
~(7,CZ,G) =u ifR(7)U3ff~Vt~ility(a,u), 
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where 3” = UaEA 3: (u is well defined as the theory is utility consistent and complete), 
and 
u (7, a, 3) is the utility of world w, for agent a under strategy profile 3. p( T, a) is the 
probability of world 7 under strategy profile (7. 
5. Discw&on 
In this section we discuss some modelling issues for the dynamic ICL. We first 
discuss how to model information-producing actions, how to model noisy sensors and 
actuators, what it means to execute a stochastic strategy, and finally the relationship to 
the extensive form of a game. Section 6 presents ome detailed examples. 
5.1. Passive sensors and information seeking actions 
The observations represent passive sensors that (at each time) receive values from the 
environment (one value from each observation alte~ative). We also do not distinguish 
between information-producing actions and actions that “change the world”; there is 
only one t.ype of action. The nature module will specify the consequences of doing an 
action. 
We can model “information-producing actions” by having actions whose effect to 
make a sensor have a value that correlates with some value in the world. For example, 
the information producing action “look” may affect what is sensed by the eyes; if the 
agent does not “look” they will sense the value “nothing”, if they do look (in a certain 
direction) they may sense what is in that direction. Of course the “look” action may 
be unreliable (the lights may be out), and it may take an arbitrary amount of time to 
achieve its effect (as in a medical test). 
What is also important is that the agent can only condition on its sense values or on 
values derived from these. The agent cannot condition on what it has no access to (e.g., 
the true state of the world). Similarly, the agent can only control what message is sent 
to its actuators; what it actually does may be quite different. 
Section 6.1 gives a detailed example and discussion of modelling passive sensors and 
info~ation seeking actions. 
5.2. Noisq sensors and actuators 
There is a straightforward way to model noisy sensors and actuators. This follows the 
distinction between the plant and the environment depicted in Fig. 3. The general idea is 
to axiomatise how the observations are a function of the percepts plus noise. Similarly 
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we can axiomatise how the actions of the agent are a function of the controls plus noise 
(for slop, errors, slippage, etc.). 
We can divide up the noise into systematic errors (e.g., that the sensor is actually 
broken, and always makes the same error) and intermittent noise (the independent error 
for each reading), and a continuum in between. For example, consider a sensor for 
checking road speeds on a highway [ 161: 
Example 41. In this example we show how to axiomatise a noisy sensor that can break 
down. The sensor is either working or not. If it is working there is some “normal” error 
from the true reading. If the sensor is not working it produces some reading at random 
(independent of the actual velocity). 
sense_velocity( V + DYT) + 
velocitysensor_OK(T) A 
velocity( YT) A 
normal_error( DYT). 
sense_velocity( EYT) +- 
~velocitysensor_OK(T) A 
error_reading( DVT) . 
We need to have a probability distribution over the normal errors. For example if the 
errors are discrete in lOkm/h steps, we can specify something like: 
‘dT {normah-ror( DYT) 1 DV E { -30, -20, -10, 0, 10,20,30}} E Co 
Po(normaZ_error( -30,T)) = 0.01 
Pa (normal_error( -20, T) ) = 0.03 
Po( normal_error( - 10, T) ) = 0.06 
PO (normaZ_error( 0, T) ) = 0.8 
Po(normal-error( 10,T)) = 0.06 
Po( normal-error( 30, T) ) = 0.03 
Po( normal_error( 30, T) ) = 0.01 
Similarly we can define error_reuding which provides a probability distribution over 
error readings. There is nothing in principle that prevents us from having a non-discrete 
distribution, such as a normal (Gaussian) distribution over errors. We have not presented 
that here as the mathematics is more complicated; we would need to consider measurable 
sets of speeds rather than the speed themselves. 
Whether the sensor is working at some time is not independent of whether it is 
working at some other time. We need to axiomatise the dynamics of sensor failure (i.e., 
we need to specify the probability distribution over time). The sensor can break at any 
time; suppose it has a 2% chance of breaking at any time when it had been working 
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and a 5% chance of being fixed up when it was broken (we could also axiomatise a 
more complicated yn~ics of how the sensor can get fixed, but this will show the main 
point). ver’ocitysensor_OK can be axiomatised as: 
veloc,itysensor_OK( T f 1) +- 
velocitysensor_OK( T) A 
~veloci~~e~sor~~a~( T) . 
velocitysensor_OK( T + 1) +. 
melocitysensor_OK( T) A 
ve~oci~~ensor_~ed( T) . 
VT {velocity_sensor_breaks( T) , velocitysensor_remains_OK( T) } f Co 
VT { velocity-sensor-jixed ( T) , velocitysensor_remains-broken ( T) } E CO 
with PO (veloci~~ensor~reu~ (T) ) = 0.02 and PO (ve~oci~~ensor-bed) = 0.05. In 
addition, we need to define the initial value of ve~oci~~ensor_OK, for example as a 
member of an alternative controlled by nature. 
5.3. Executing a strategy 
What does it mean for an agent to execute a s~ategy? If the strategy for the agent 
is pure, then it will tell the agent what to do based on its sensor values. The agent 
will “do” .the unambiguous actions that are entailed. If the strategy for the agent is not 
pure, then there may be a number of things that the agent could attempt o do based 
on its inputs. To follow a strategy it should pick the actions randomly according to the 
dis~ibution specified in the strategy. 
Picking strategies at random does not mean that there must be a random number 
generator in the robot (or access to some really random quantum phenomenon), although 
it could. For example, for the soccer playing robots we could compile in the randomness, 
by choosing offline whether it should go right or left according to the random strategy, 
If we did this then we would have to hide our design from our opponent designer 
and replace our robot after a single penalty kick. An alternative would be to have two 
non-random robots, where we choose one at random for each penalty kick. These two 
robots, together with the choosing mechanism, can be seen as one randomizing agent. 
The most important property is that the other agent is not able to predict what our agent 
will do. 
It is silly to think of an agent cheating, by not choosing from the random distribution. 
This is particularly the case when we consider that the agent gets to choose whichever 
strategy it wants. Cheating with one strategy is the same as choosing a different strategy. 
We will then consider it to be that strategy that the agent is carrying out. This does 
not mean that an agent cannot lie about what strategy it is carrying out. What an agent 
says about what it will do will be another action of the agent, and it can do whatever it 
wants. 
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5.4. Non-deterministic actions and the frame problem 
There has been much work on logical specifications of actions and change. The speci- 
fication of actions that solves the frame problem is well understood for the deterministic 
case with complete knowledge [ 27,45,50]. These axiomatisations assume the closure 
of the axiomatisation for change. See [2] for a detailed description of axiomatising 
change with acyclic programs. 
What is added in this work is a way to handle non-deterministic actions and partial 
knowledge. The central idea is that determinism and complete knowledge (as assumed 
in negation as failure) occurs for each world. We can have a distribution over worlds. 
When we have uncertainty, it is useful to consider the question of “who chooses the 
value”. Often it is random, but often it is another agent. What we require is that the 
axiomatiser resolves this ambiguity. 
Example 42. We can axiomatise a coin toss, where, when a coin is tossed, it lands 
heads 50% of the time and tails 50% of the time; when it is not tossed, it remains in 
the state (heads or tails) it was before: 
heads(C,T+ I) t 
tossed( C, T) A 
heads_tums_up( C, T) . 
heads(C,T+ 1) t 
+ossed( C, T) A 
heads( C, T) . 
taiZs( C, T) +- lheads( C, T) 
where heads(C, T) is true if coin C has heads up at time T. heads_tumsap(C, T) is 
true at time T if heads would turn up on coin C is it were tossed at time T. It is defined 
as: 
VC VT { headxtums-up ( C, T) , tailsfurnsup ( C, T) } E Co 
with VC VT Po( heads-turns-up( C, T) ) = 0.5. 
Many of the papers that present a solution to the frame problem [2,27,45,50] use 
the situation calculus for representing change, rather than the discrete time model used 
here. See [40] for a description of how the situation calculus can be combined with the 
independent choice logic. 
5.5. The extensive form of a game 
The extensive form of a game [ 17,32,53] is a representation of a game in terms of a 
game tree, a generalisation of a decision tree to include different agents making decisions 
at each node, and having information sets of nodes that agents cannot distinguish. 
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“The extensive form of a game contains the following information: 
( 1) the set of players, 
(2) the order of the moves, i.e., who moves when, 
(3) the players’ payoffs as a function of the moves that were made, 
(4) what the players’ choices are when they move, 
(5) what each player knows when he makes his choices, 
(6) t.he probability distribution over any exogenous events.” [ 17, p. 771 
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There is a direct mapping between the dynamic ICL and the extensive form of a 
game. d is the set of players. The logic program specifies the payoffs as a function of 
the moves (actions) of the players. The set C, specifies the players’ choices when they 
move. The v function specifies what each player knows when it makes its move. Pa 
provides a probability function over exogenous events represented as the independent 
random variables in CO. 
The ord.er of the moves is defined by the acyclicity of the knowledge base. The moves 
must be ordered so that the information is available before the decision is made. If there 
is some acyclicity ordering such that ~1 is before x2 then xi can be made before ~2; 
if there is another acyclicity ordering where x2 is before xi, then it does not matter in 
which ord.er the choices are made (as all of the information available for each choice 
cannot depend on the other choice). 
While the acyclicity of the rule base was chosen in order to allow for a sim- 
ple semantic framework [36], it can be justified by appealing to the structure of 
games. 
6. Examples in detail 
In this section we present three different examples of using the ICL. The first demon- 
strates so-called “information seeking actions” and noisy sensors and actuators. The 
second prlesents a decision-theoretic planning example. The third defines a two-player, 
imperfect information game of blind tic-tat-toe. There are intended to show the details 
of the representation, and were not chosen because they are elegant examples for the 
formalism. 
6.1. Information seeking actions and noisy sensors 
In this section we give an ideal&d single agent in an environment example, showing 
how to model the following: 
l Information producing actions, such as tests in diagnosis and positioning a camera 
in robotics, or asking a question in a user modelling situation. 
l Comlitional plans (conditioning on sense values). 
l How a passive sensor can be used to model an active sensor that “looks”. 
l How noisy sensors and actuators can be modelled (Section 6.1.4). 
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Fig. 4. Influence diagram for our idealised example. 
6.1. I. Informution producing actions 
The look? decision of Fig. 4 can be seen as an information producing action. It lets 
information about isTrue be available to the next action. It also has a cost associated 
with it. 
The agents action can either be look or dontlook. The action can be modelled by 
having 
{look, dontlook} E C 
with our agent controlling this alternative. 
In the rule base we model how actions by the agent and truths in the world affect 
sense values for the agent. Here is an idealised example for the case where there is no 
noise. (Section 6.1.4 considers noise.) Suppose that following the looking, the agent 
can sense either pos, neg or nothing. For the case with no noise, the environment model 
has the following axioms in 3: 
sense(pos) + look A is-true. 
sense( neg) + look A +-true. 
sense ( nothing) +- dent-look. 
Thus “looK’ provides information about “is_true” to “do-it”. 
6.1.2. Conditioning on sense values 
The agent can sense the world, and then decide what to do based on the sense values. 
Continuing our example, suppose that the agent has possible actions doit, dontdoit, 
and has the sense values above. There are three independent choices the agent can make, 
namely whether or not to doit for each of the three contingencies. 
Within the ICL this can be modelled by having the axioms: 
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doit +- sense(pos) A do-ifgos. 
dont_doit c sense(pos) A dontifpos. 
do-it +- sense{ neg) A doijlneg. 
dent_doit +- sense( neg) A dontifneg. 
doit c sense (nothing) A doifnothing. 
dent_doit + sensefnothing) A dont$nothing. 




Within ithe dynamic ICL we specify: 
(doit, dontdo-it} E C,,,t 
0 ngenr = { (sense(pos) , sense( neg) , sense(not~ing) )) 
T( {doit, dont-doit}) = { { sense(pos) , sense( neg) , sense( nothing)}) 
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The rules that need to be provided as part defining the ICL are created as part of the 
agent’s trategy in the dynamic ICL. 
6.1.3. Utility model 
Finally, a utility model (part of the environment model) specifies how the utility 
varies depending on what is true and what the agent does. Here is an example of such 
an an axiomatisation (given that our agent is agent, ): 
~ti~~~(agent, , Fnie - K) +- 
tesr_cost( TC) A 
prize{ Prize). 
test_ct?st( 5) * look. 
test-cost(O) c dent-look. 
prize{ 10) c doit A is-true. 
prize( 0) c dont_doit A is-true. 
prize( 8) c dontdoit A -&true. 
prize{ 1) +-- doit A -+true. 
6.1.4. Noisy actuators and sensors 
In Section 6.1.1 we assume that there were no noise in either actuator settings or in 
sense values. We can model actuator noise, for example in the “looking” actuator, by 
something like: 
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see +- look A looking-works 
see t dontlook A not_looking_doesnt_work 
with following in C, controlled by nature: 
{looking-works, lookingdoesnt-work} 
{not-looking-works, not-lookingdoesnt-work} 
Po(looking_works) is the probability that the agent succeeds in seeing when it looks. 
Pu( notlooking-doesnt-work) is the probability that that agent sees when it does not 
look. 
Noisy sensors can be modelled similarly. Assume that the value sensed only depends 
on whether the agent sees, but that there is no noise with respect to not seeing. There 
are two alternatives controlled by nature: 
Gfalsepositive, truenegative} 
Gfalsenegative, true-positive} 
and the following facts: 
sense(pos) +- see A is-true A true-positive. 
sense ( -) + see A isfrue A falsenegative. 
sense( -) + see A G-true A truenegative. 
sense(pos) c see A +s_true A falsegositive. 
sense( nothing) c 7see. 
Po(falsepositive) is the probability of a false-positive; when the sensor reports positive 
when the value in the world is not true. PoCfalsenegative) is the probability of a 
false-negative; when the sensor reports negative when the value in the world is true. 
6.2. Shipping widgets 
In this section we present an example of Draper et al. [ 141. The example is that of a 
robot that must process a widget. Its goal is to have the widget painted and processed 
and then to notify its supervisor that it is done. Processing consists of rejecting flawed 
widgets and shipping untlawed widgets. The robot can inspect the widget to see if it is 
blemished, which initially correlates with the widget being flawed. Painting the widget 
usually results in the widget being painted but removes blemishes. 
Agent module. We first represent the robot. The robot has one sensor for detecting 
blemishes. sense(blemished,T) is true if the robot senses that the widget is blemished 
at time T. 
The robot has 6 actions (exactly one of which is possible at any time), namely to 
reject, ship, notify, paint or inspect the widget or do nothing. do(A,T) is true if the 
robot does action A at time T. 
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The robot specification module for robot is the tuple (Crobot, Orobor, r) where 
C robor = { {do( reject, T) , do( ship, T) , do(notify, T) , do(paint, T) , 
do( inspect, T), do(nothing, T)} 1 T is a time}. 
0 rob,,t = { { lsense( blemished, T) , sense ( blemished, T) } 1 T is a time}. 
T( {do( reject, T) , do(ship, T) , do(notify, T) , do(paint, T) , 
do( inspect, T) , do(nothing, T)}) 
= { { lsense( blemished, T’) , sense( blemished, T’) } 1 T’ < T}. 
In other words, at each time, the robot gets to choose which of the six actions it carries 
out. When it is making this decision, it knows whether or not it has sensed blemishes 
in the past. 
Nature module. The remaining thing to define is the rules and alternatives controlled 
by nature. This specifies the dynamics of the world. We axiomatise how the robot’s 
actions affect the world, how the world affects the senses of the robot. 
The widget being painted persists in the world. Painting the widget can result in the 
widget being painted (with probability 0.95). We assume that whether painting works 
does not depend on the time (a second painting will not make the widget more likely 
to be painted). Painting only works if it has not already been shipped or rejected. Once 
painted, a widget remains painted. 
painted(T + 1) + 
do(paint, T) A 
paint-works A 
vhipped( T) A 
-vejected( T) . 
pain,ted(T + 1) +- 
painted(T) . 
Painting succeeds 95% of the time: 
(pai8~t_works,paintfils} E Co 
P0(paint_works) = 0.95, Po(paintfails) = 0.05 
Note that we have not parametrized paint-works by the time. This is lets us model the 
fact that repainting will not help when painting failed the first time. In any possible 
world where paintfails is true, painting always results in the widget being painted, and 
if it is false, painting always results in the widget being painted. 
The widget is blemished if and only if it is flawed and not painted: 
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btemished( T) +- 
~uwed(T) A 
lpuinted( T) . 
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Note that the use of logic programs, assuming the stable model semantics entails that 
the rules mean “if and only if” (in the same way Clark’s completion [111 does). 
Whether the widget is flawed or not persists: 
Jlawed( T + 1) +- @wed{ T) . 





~hipped( T) A 
+uwed( T) . 
The widget is shipped if the robot ships it, and being shipped persists: 
s~ipped( T) +-- dofship, T) . 
shipped( T + 1) + shipped(T) . 
The widget is rejected if the robot rejects it, and being rejected persists: 
rejected(T) c do( reject, T). 
rejected{ T + 1) + Ejected(T) . 
We axiomatise how what the robot senses is affected by the robot’s actions and the 
world: 
sease( blemished, T + 1) +- 
da{ inspect, T) A 
blemished(T) A 
+zlsepos( T) . 
The sensor gives a false positive with probability 0.1. Unlike whether punting succeeds, 
suppose the probability of the sensor giving a false positive at each time is independent 
of what happens at other times: 
Gfulsepos( T) , not$uZsepos( T) } E Co 
PO ~u~~e~~~( T) ) = 0.1 
Po(notfuZse_pos(T)) = 0.9 
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30% of widgets are initially flawed: 
cfzawed( 0)) ~~~ff~e~( 0) ) E Co 
Pe (j!awerl( 0) ) = 0.3 
PO (ufzJEawed( 0) ) = 0.7 
Finally we specify how the utility is dependent on the world and actions of the robot. 
The utility is one if the widget is painted and processed the first time the robot notifies, 
and is zero otherwise. 
utility( robot, 1) +- 
dc( notify, T) A 
~~zoti~ed~efore( T) I\ 
painted(T) A 
processed(T). 
~tility( robot, 0) + ~~ti~i~( robot, 1) . 
notifed_before( T) c TI < T A do( notify, TI ) . 
One (pure) policy for our robot is the logic program: 
do( inspect, 0). 
do(paint, 1). 
do ( reject, 2) t sense( blemished, 1) . 
do( ship, 2) t lsense( blemished, 1) . 
do( notify, 3). 
This has expected utility 0.925. Note that in the problem formulation, we need to paint 
blemished widgets. 
This policy is not optimal. Policy: 
do( inspect, 0). 
do ( inspect, 1) . 
do(pzint, 2). 
do( reject, 3) c sense( blemished, I ) . 
do(reject, 3) +- sense(blemished, 2). 
do( ship, 3) c vense( blemished, 1) A lsense( blemished, 2). 
do(notify,4). 
has expected utility 0.94715. There is no optimal policy for this example (it is not a 
finite game so Nash’s theorem does not apply here), we can add more “inspect”s to 
keep raising the expected utility. 
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The best policy without inspecting, namely {&Quint, 0)) do(ship, 1) , do(noti;fy, 2)) 
has expected utility 0.665. 
Of course, we can always define the utility so that the robot is penalized for taking 
too much time, e.g., by defining utility by: 
utility( robot, 1 - T/ 10) +- rewarded(T) 
utility( robot, 0) +- vvwarded_atsome_time. 
rewarded_atsome-time +- rewarded(T) . 
rewarded(T) c 
do( notify, T) A 
lnoti$edbefore( T) A 
painted(T) A 
processed ( T) . 
Under the revised utility, the first policy above (with a single inspect) is optimal, with 
expected utility 0,625. 
6.3. Blind tic-tat-toe 
Koller and Pfeffer [26] present a game description language Gala. In that language 
they represent the game “blind tic-tat-toe”. We represent the same game in the ICL in 
order to present a parlour-game example and to enable us to compare the representation 
with Gala. 
Blind tic-tat-toe is an imperfect information version of standard tic-tat-toe: 
“As in regular tic-tat-toe, the players take turns placing marks in squares. How- 
ever, on his turn, each player can choose to mark either an x or an o; he reveals 
to his opponent the square in which he makes the mark, but not what type of 
make he makes. As usual, the goal is to complete a line of three squares with 
the same mark.” [26] 
The basic idea in defining such a game is to axiomatise the dynamics of the game in 
the logic. The rules should imply the consequences of the choices made by agents. 
First we need a representation for the state of the game. In this game, the order of 
the moves is important as well as who put what where (as the last player who places a 
marker to make three in a row wins). We can represent the state of the game as a list 
of the form put( X, Y Who, What) which means that the player “Who” (either a or b) 
put “What” (an o or an x) at position (X, Y) . The first element of the list was the last 
element placed there. 
The first rule defines the first move. The second rule for the state progression defines 
subsequent moves: 
sture( [put( X, KAgent, What) 1, s( 0) ) +- 
starts(Agent) A 
chooses(Agent,place( X, E: What), 0). 
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stutc?( [put(X, ZAgent, What) ,put(Xp, Yp, Ap, Wp) /Rest], s(T)) c 
stat4 [put(Xp, Yp, AP, Wp) IRest], T) A 
$nished( [put( Xp, Yp, Ap, Wp) IRest] ) A 
opponent(Ap, Agent) A 
chooses(Agent,place(X, I: What), T). 
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We can define auxiliary relations such as who starts, and how the moves alternate, and 
when the game is finished. 
stana( a). 
opponent( a, b) . 
opponent( b, a). 
$nished( S) + 
draw(S) . 
jinisized( S) +- 
wins( A, S). 
draw(S) c 
length( S, 9). 
We can axiomatise the utility functions. Note that we are relying on the fact that for 
any particular set of choices by agents, there is only one win state or one draw state. 
utiZi;y( a, 1) t 
wins( a, S). 
utili[y( a, 0) +- 
wi,rzs( b, S) . 
utili[v( a, 0.5) c 
dmw( S). 
uti&u( b, 1) t 
wirzs( b, S) . 
utiZity( b, 0) c 
wins( u, S). 
utiZiQ( a, 0.5) c 
dmw( S). 
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We can axiomatise the choices by the agents: t5 
chooses (Agent, place( X, I: What), T) +- 
chooseX(Agent, X, T) A 
chooseY(Agent, X, T) A 
chooseWhat(Agent, What, T). 
The agents get to choose the X position, the Y position, and what mark they make. 
ThUS, 
VT {chooseX(Agent, 1, T) , chooseX(Agent, 2, T) , chooseX(Agent, 3, T)} E C,+,r 
VT {chooseY(Agent, 1, T), chooseY(Agent, 2, T), chooseY(Agent, 3, T)} E C.+enr 
VT {chooseWhat(Agent, o, T), chooseWhat(Agent, x, T)} E C,+,ent 
Now we have to decide what an agent gets to observe when making their decision. 
We assume that for each of these choices the agent gets to observe a filtered version of 
the state, which consists of a list of poswho( X, I: Who) for each square and a list of 
pos_what( X, I: What) for the squares they occupy: 
sense(Agent, Pas_WhoList, Pas_WhatList, T) + 
stute( S, T) A 
extractpos_who-Zist( S, Pos_Who_List) A 
extract.pos_what_list(Agent, S, Pas_WhatList) .
extruct_pos_who_list( [ ] , [ ] > .
extructposwho_list( [put( X, XAgent, What) IS11 , [pos_who( X, x Who) IP 11) t 
extract_pos_who_list( Sl , P 1) . 
Similarly for extruct_pos_whatlist. 
The observable function can be given by: l6 
z-( {chooseX(Agent, 1, T) , chooseX(Agent, 2, T) , chooseX(Agent, 3, T)}) 
= {{sense(Agent, Pos_WhoList, Pos_WhatList, T)} 1 
Pos_WhoList, PosWhatList are appropriate lists}. 
The other two choices have similar information sets, but include the previous decisions 
(i.e., the agent knows which X it chose when choosing a Y). 
I5 This is one simple way to axiomatise the choices. It means that agents can choose to place a mark in 
an occupied space (presumably they will be penalized by losing if they choose an occupied spot). Another 
method is that the agent can derive a list of free spaces from the sensed information, and then can only choose 
an element from this list. 
I6 We have neither presented a syntax for r, nor a syntax for the choices. This is because we only wanted 
to present object level rules, in order to not have to present two different logical formalisms. It is hoped that 
this set notation gets the general idea across. 
D. P~l~~ie/Ar~~ciai Intelligence 94 (1997) 7-56 53 
For those who do not like to read declarative logical formulae, the best way to 
understand these rules is to think about building a game tree by forward chaining on 
the rules. a starts and so must make a choice of the X position, the Y position, and 
what mark they are making. This forms an l&way split in the game tree (there are 18 
different Ichoices available to a). Then the state evolves by b making a move. There are 
9 different information states for b, and they have to choose one of 18 choices (or I6 
if the alternative ~iomatisation is made). And so on building the game tree. 
It is envisioned that such a representation could be used to build the same game 
tree as for Gala [ 261, and can use the same efficient algorithms. The representation 
proposed in this paper is more declarative (in that we can give a declarative possible 
worlds semantics for the whole framework, and all of the logical rules can be interpreted 
as statements about the domain), and more general in that it is not tuned specifically to 
2-person alternating ames. In fact the ICL is not tuned for any particular application; 
there are no built in predicates, and no syntax beyond that of the logic. This may mean 
that Gala is more natural for those games it is designed for, but we believe that the 
more general anguage will be more useful for general specification of decision problems 
under uncertainty. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has presented alogic that allows for what is arguably a natural specification 
of multi-agent decision problems. There is a simple semantic framework in terms of 
possible worlds semantics. It lets us use logic to specify the dynamics of the world, 
while retaining the elegance and generality of game theory. 
What we are adding to game theory is an object-level representation f the domain. 
We can axiomatise how actions (moves) affect the world, how the utility is derived from 
simpler components, and how sensors work. All of these axioms can be interpreted within 
the simple logic. It allows us to represent the probabilistic dependencies in a domain, in 
much the same way that influence diagrams provide a more intuitive representation for 
many problems than decision trees [ 22,231. We also allow for a form of parametrized 
rules by the use of logical variables that allow us to construct large game trees from 
smaller components. 
We are adding to influence diagrams, the ability to represent multiple agents, the 
ability to represent I7 structured probability and decision tables, and a way to have a 
dynamic construction of influence diagrams (with a similar motivation to Breese [ 91, 
but having logic programs as object-level statements about the world rather than at the 
meta-level as does Breese). We also allow for the designer to axiomatise the dynamics 
of the sydem, instead of having to summarize it in a single step as a probability 
distribution. 
We are adding to logic a new way to handle and think about non-determinism and 
uncertainty. Rather than just using disjunction which does not seem to be subtle enough 
for the range of forms of uncertainty that we need to handle, we provide a mechanism in 
I7 In other papers we show how the structure can be exploited for computational gain [ 38,411. 
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terms of independent choices to handle uncertainty. We argue that considering different 
agents making choices is the right way to think about uncertainty in a logical formalism. 
The ICL is weaker than other mixes of logic and decision theory for modelling agents [ 3, 
19,20,24] which have added probability and decisions to a rich logic. They do not have 
general independence assumptions (although they can state independence assumptions), 
and have to cope with many different forms of uncertainty (e.g., disjunction as well as 
choices by agents). The goals of this paper are different: we are investigating a different 
way of viewing uncertainty for modelling agents. We are looking for ways to make 
representations of the world simpler. Whether we have succeeded in this is an open 
question. 
Conspicuous by its absence in this paper is a discussion on computation. In this 
context, computation can mean three things: ( 1) building a situated agent that embodies 
a strategy; (2) simulating a policy and environment; or (3) finding an optimal strategy. A 
Prolog implementation of the second that finds expected utilities of strategies is available 
from the author’s web page. l8 It should be noted that the computational complexity 
of finding Nash equilibria, even the propositional, single-agent without perfect recall 
case is exponentially harder to solve than an influence diagram [25]. Intuitively this 
is because dynamic programming does not work when we have a forgetful agent; we 
cannot solve the last decision independently of the earlier decisions [ 541. This is not 
a problem with the representation; it is the problems that are difficult. It is not clear 
whether the representation in this formalism makes the problems more difficult to solve. 
There is some, however, evidence that the representation presented here makes solving 
a decision problem easier than in an influence diagram, as we can exploit the rules 
structure. [5,38,41] There is much more work to be done on exact and approximate 
algorithms for the problems represented in the ICL. 
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